

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 1336

To provide for an assessment of the achievement by the Government of Iraq of benchmarks for political settlement and national reconciliation in Iraq.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 8, 2007

Ms. SNOWE (for herself and Mr. BAYH) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To provide for an assessment of the achievement by the Government of Iraq of benchmarks for political settlement and national reconciliation in Iraq.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. ASSESSMENT OF ACHIEVEMENT BY THE GOV-**
4 **ERNMENT OF IRAQ OF BENCHMARKS FOR PO-**
5 **LITICAL SETTLEMENT AND NATIONAL REC-**
6 **ONCILIATION IN IRAQ.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
8 ings:

1 (1) Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and
2 ever-widening problem of sectarian and intra-sec-
3 tarian violence based upon political distrust and cul-
4 tural differences between some Sunni and Shia Mus-
5 lims, concentrated primarily in Baghdad.

6 (2) Iraqis must reach political settlements in
7 order to achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the
8 Iraqis to reach such settlements to support a truly
9 unified government greatly contributes to the in-
10 creasing violence in Iraq.

11 (3) The responsibility for internal security and
12 halting sectarian violence in Iraq must rest primarily
13 with the Government of Iraq, relying on the Iraqi
14 Security Forces (ISF).

15 (4) On January 10, 2007, President George W.
16 Bush announced a new strategy for Iraq, which con-
17 sists of three basic elements: diplomatic, economic,
18 and military. The central component of the military
19 element is an augmentation of the present level of
20 United States military forces in Iraq with more than
21 20,000 additional United States military forces to
22 “work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in
23 their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined
24 mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighbor-
25 hoods, to help them protect the local population, and

1 to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are
2 capable of providing the security that Baghdad
3 needs”.

4 (5) President George W. Bush said on January
5 10, 2007, that “I’ve made it clear to the Prime Min-
6 ister and Iraq’s other leaders that America’s com-
7 mitment is not open-ended” so as to dispel the con-
8 trary impression that exists.

9 (6) The Commander, Multi-National Forces-
10 Iraq, General David Petraeus, stated during his con-
11 firmation hearing before the Committee on Armed
12 Services of the Senate, on January 23, 2007, that
13 it is “very important” for Iraqis to understand that
14 they need to reach the political settlements which
15 are essential to resolve the sectarian violence and to
16 defeat insurgents.

17 (7) General Petraeus acknowledged during his
18 confirmation hearing before the Committee on
19 Armed Services of the Senate, on January 23, 2007,
20 that political settlement and political settlement
21 alone by the Iraqis is our ultimate way of providing
22 security and success in Iraq.

23 (8) General Petraeus stated on March 8, 2007
24 that “[a] political resolution of various differences,
25 of this legislation, of various senses that people do

1 not have a stake in the success of the new Iraq, and
2 so forth, that is crucial. That is what will determine
3 in the long run the success of this effort”. In an
4 April 26, 2007, news conference, General Petraeus
5 said that the situation in Iraq remains “exceedingly
6 difficult”.

7 (9) General Petraeus, as principal author of
8 Army Field Manual 3–24 (MCWP 3–33.5),
9 Counterinsurgency, released in December 2006, and
10 therefore possessing the unique understanding and
11 experience regarding the principles and fundamen-
12 tals of pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy, states
13 that “[i]n the end, the host nation has to win on its
14 own. Achieving this requires development of viable
15 local leaders and institutions. U.S. forces and agen-
16 cies can help, but [Host Nation] elements must ac-
17 cept responsibilities to achieve real victory”.

18 (10) United States military operations in Iraq
19 should be conducted alongside a comprehensive dip-
20 lomatic, political, and economic strategy that in-
21 cludes sustained engagement with Iraq’s neighbors
22 and the international community for the purpose of
23 working collectively to bring stability to Iraq.

24 (11) United States military personnel are cur-
25 rently serving in Iraq with the bravery and profes-

1 sionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the
2 United States Armed Forces. Many have lost their
3 lives, and many more have been wounded. They have
4 and deserve the support of all Americans, and the
5 American people will always honor their sacrifices
6 and honor their families.

7 (12) United States strategy in Iraq should be
8 conditioned on the meeting by the Government of
9 Iraq of specific benchmarks, as laid out by the
10 President and in consultation with Congress, and re-
11 flected in the commitments of the Government of
12 Iraq to the international community.

13 (13) The meeting of these benchmarks by the
14 Government of Iraq should be viewed as the condi-
15 tion for continued United States military and eco-
16 nomic involvement in Iraq.

17 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
18 gress that Congress should not take any action, including
19 the elimination or reduction of funds, that will impair the
20 mission of the United States military forces in the field,
21 undermine their safety or harm their effectiveness in pur-
22 suing their assigned missions.

23 (c) REPORT ON ACHIEVEMENT OF BENCHMARKS.—

24 (1) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after
25 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Com-

1 mander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, having con-
2 sulted with relevant United States and Iraqi offi-
3 cials, shall submit to Congress an independent re-
4 port setting forth the status of the achievement of
5 the benchmarks specified in paragraph (2) and stat-
6 ing the Commander's assessment whether or not
7 each such benchmark has been met. The Com-
8 mander shall prepare and submit the report in co-
9 ordination with the Director of National Intelligence.

10 (2) BENCHMARKS.—The benchmarks specified
11 in this paragraph are as follows:

12 (A) The assumption by Iraq of control of
13 its military.

14 (B) The enactment and implementation of
15 a Militia Law to disarm and demobilize militias
16 and to ensure that Iraqi security forces are ac-
17 countable only to the central government and
18 loyal to the constitution of Iraq.

19 (C) The completion of the review of the
20 constitution of Iraq and the holding of a ref-
21 erendum on special amendments to the con-
22 stitution of Iraq to ensure equitable participa-
23 tion in the Government of Iraq without regard
24 to religious sect or ethnicity.

1 (D) The completion of a provincial election
2 law and the commencement and specific prepa-
3 ration for the conduct of provincial elections
4 that ensures equitable constitution of provincial
5 representative bodies without regard to religious
6 sect or ethnicity.

7 (E) The enactment and implementation of
8 legislation to ensure that the energy resources
9 of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs,
10 Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable
11 manner.

12 (F) The enactment and implementation of
13 legislation that equitably reforms the de-
14 Ba'athification process in Iraq.

15 (3) TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESS.—Not later
16 than 14 days after the submittal to Congress of the
17 report required by paragraph (1), the Commander,
18 Multi-National Forces-Iraq shall appear before each
19 of the appropriate committees of Congress to testify
20 with respect to the success or failure of the Govern-
21 ment of Iraq in meeting the benchmarks specified in
22 paragraph (2). If, in the Commander's assessment
23 as set forth in the report, the Government of Iraq
24 has failed to meet any such benchmarks, the Com-

1 mander shall also submit in his testimony each of
2 the following:

3 (A) Plans for the phased redeployment of
4 United States forces currently deployed to Iraq
5 in support of the Baghdad Security Plan as
6 outlined by the President.

7 (B) Subject to paragraph (4), plans for
8 changing the mission of the remaining United
9 States forces in Iraq to—

10 (i) training and equipping Iraqi
11 forces;

12 (ii) assisting deployed Iraqi brigades
13 with intelligence, transportation, air sup-
14 port, and logistics support;

15 (iii) protecting United States and coa-
16 lition personnel and infrastructure; and

17 (iv) maintaining rapid-reaction teams
18 and special operations teams to undertake
19 strike missions against al Qaeda in Iraq,
20 and for other missions considered vital by
21 the United States commander in Iraq.

22 (4) The Commander, Multi-National Forces-
23 Iraq shall devise the plans described in paragraph
24 (3)(B) with the objective of successfully accom-
25 plishing the change in mission within six months of

1 the date of his testimony before Congress. The Com-
 2 mander shall further indicate the number of troops
 3 needed to successfully complete the changed mission
 4 and the estimated duration of that mission.

5 (5) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS
 6 DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appro-
 7 priate committees of Congress” means—

8 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of
 9 the Senate; and

10 (B) the Committee on Armed Services of
 11 the House of Representatives.

12 (d) COMPTROLLER GENERAL ASSESSMENT.—Not
 13 later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
 14 this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States
 15 shall submit to Congress an independent report setting
 16 forth—

17 (1) the status of the achievement of the bench-
 18 marks specified in subsection (c)(2); and

19 (2) the Comptroller General’s assessment
 20 whether or not each such benchmark has been met.

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