

110TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# S. 1144

To provide for an assessment of the achievement by the Government of Iraq of benchmarks for political settlement and national reconciliation in Iraq.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 18, 2007

Ms. SNOWE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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## A BILL

To provide for an assessment of the achievement by the Government of Iraq of benchmarks for political settlement and national reconciliation in Iraq.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. ASSESSMENT OF ACHIEVEMENT BY THE GOV-**  
4 **ERNMENT OF IRAQ OF BENCHMARKS FOR PO-**  
5 **LITICAL SETTLEMENT AND NATIONAL REC-**  
6 **ONCILIATION IN IRAQ.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-  
8 ings:

1           (1) Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and  
2           ever-widening problem of sectarian and intra-sec-  
3           tarian violence based upon political distrust and cul-  
4           tural differences between some Sunni and Shia Mus-  
5           lims, concentrated primarily in Baghdad.

6           (2) Iraqis must reach political settlements in  
7           order to achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the  
8           Iraqis to reach such settlements to support a truly  
9           unified government greatly contributes to the in-  
10          creasing violence in Iraq.

11          (3) The responsibility for internal security and  
12          halting sectarian violence in Iraq must rest primarily  
13          with the Government of Iraq, relying on the Iraqi  
14          Security Forces (ISF).

15          (4) On January 10, 2007, President George W.  
16          Bush announced a new strategy for Iraq, which con-  
17          sists of three basic elements: diplomatic, economic,  
18          and military. The central component of the military  
19          element is an augmentation of the present level of  
20          United States military forces in Iraq with more than  
21          20,000 additional United States military forces to  
22          “work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in  
23          their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined  
24          mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighbor-  
25          hoods, to help them protect the local population, and

1 to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are  
2 capable of providing the security that Baghdad  
3 needs”.

4 (5) President George W. Bush said on January  
5 10, 2007, that “I’ve made it clear to the Prime Min-  
6 ister and Iraq’s other leaders that America’s com-  
7 mitment is not open-ended” so as to dispel the con-  
8 trary impression that exists.

9 (6) The Commander, Multi-National Forces—  
10 Iraq, General David Petraeus, stated during his con-  
11 firmation hearing before the Committee on Armed  
12 Services of the Senate, on January 23, 2007, that  
13 it is “very important” for Iraqis to understand that  
14 they need to reach the political settlements which  
15 are essential to resolve the sectarian violence and to  
16 defeat insurgents.

17 (7) General Petraeus acknowledged during his  
18 confirmation hearing before the Committee on  
19 Armed Services of the Senate, on January 23, 2007,  
20 that political settlement and political settlement  
21 alone by the Iraqis is our ultimate way of providing  
22 security and success in Iraq.

23 (8) General Petraeus stated on March 8, 2007  
24 that “[a] political resolution of various differences,  
25 of this legislation, of various senses that people do

1 not have a stake in the success of the new Iraq, and  
2 so forth, that is crucial. That is what will determine  
3 in the long run the success of this effort”.

4 (9) General Petraeus, as principal author of  
5 Army Field Manual 3–24 (MCWP 3–33.5),  
6 Counterinsurgency, released in December 2006, and  
7 therefore possessing the unique understanding and  
8 experience regarding the principles and fundamen-  
9 tals of pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy, states  
10 that “[i]n the end, the host nation has to win on its  
11 own. Achieving this requires development of viable  
12 local leaders and institutions. U.S. forces and agen-  
13 cies can help, but [Host Nation] elements must ac-  
14 cept responsibilities to achieve real victory”.

15 (10) United States military operations in Iraq  
16 should be conducted alongside a comprehensive dip-  
17 lomatic, political, and economic strategy that in-  
18 cludes sustained engagement with Iraq’s neighbors  
19 and the international community for the purpose of  
20 working collectively to bring stability to Iraq.

21 (11) United States strategy in Iraq should be  
22 conditioned on the meeting by the Government of  
23 Iraq of specific benchmarks, as laid out by the  
24 President and in consultation with Congress, and re-

1       flected in the commitments of the Government of  
2       Iraq to the international community.

3           (12) The meeting of these benchmarks by the  
4       Government of Iraq should be viewed as the condi-  
5       tion for continued United States military and eco-  
6       nomic involvement in Iraq.

7       (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
8       gress that Congress should not take any action, including  
9       the elimination or reduction of funds, that will impair the  
10      mission of the United States military forces in the field,  
11      undermine their safety or harm their effectiveness in pur-  
12      suing their assigned missions.

13      (c) REPORT ON ACHIEVEMENT OF BENCHMARKS.—

14           (1) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after  
15      the date of the enactment of this Act, the Com-  
16      mander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, having con-  
17      sulted with relevant United States and Iraqi offi-  
18      cials, shall submit to Congress a report setting forth  
19      the status of the achievement of the benchmarks  
20      specified in paragraph (2), and stating the Com-  
21      mander's assessment whether or not each such  
22      benchmark has been met.

23           (2) BENCHMARKS.—The benchmarks specified  
24      in this paragraph are as follows:

1           (A) The assumption by Iraq of control of  
2           its military.

3           (B) The enactment of a Militia Law to dis-  
4           arm and demobilize militias and to ensure that  
5           Iraqi security forces are accountable only to the  
6           central government and loyal to the constitution  
7           of Iraq.

8           (C) The completion of the review of the  
9           constitution of Iraq and the holding of a ref-  
10          erendum on special amendments to the con-  
11          stitution of Iraq to ensure equitable participa-  
12          tion in the Government of Iraq without regard  
13          to religious sect or ethnicity.

14          (D) The completion of provincial election  
15          law and preparation for the conduct of provin-  
16          cial elections that ensures equitable constitution  
17          of provincial representative bodies without re-  
18          gard to religious sect or ethnicity.

19          (E) The enactment and implementation of  
20          legislation to ensure that the energy resources  
21          of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs,  
22          Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable  
23          manner.

1 (F) The enactment and implementation of  
2 legislation that equitably reforms the de-  
3 Ba'athification process in Iraq.

4 (3) TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESS.—Not later  
5 than 14 days after submittal to Congress of the re-  
6 port required by paragraph (1), the Commander,  
7 Multi-National Forces-Iraq shall appear before each  
8 of the appropriate committees of Congress to testify  
9 with respect to the following:

10 (A) The success or failure of the Govern-  
11 ment of Iraq in meeting the benchmarks speci-  
12 fied in paragraph (2).

13 (B) The capacity of the Government of  
14 Iraq to meet any of such benchmarks that that  
15 Government has failed to meet.

16 (4) TESTIMONY ON ADDITIONAL MATTER.—If  
17 the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq testifies  
18 that the Government of Iraq has failed to meet any  
19 of the benchmarks specified in paragraph (2), the  
20 Commander shall also submit in the testimony re-  
21 ferred to in paragraph (3) the following:

22 (A) Plans for the phased redeployment of  
23 United States forces currently deployed to Iraq  
24 in support of the Baghdad Security Plan as  
25 outlined by the President.

1 (B) Plans for changing the mission of  
 2 United States forces in Iraq to—

3 (i) training and equipping Iraqi  
 4 forces;

5 (ii) assisting deployed Iraqi brigades  
 6 with intelligence, transportation, air sup-  
 7 port, and logistics support;

8 (iii) protecting United States and coa-  
 9 lition personnel and infrastructure; and

10 (iv) maintaining rapid-reaction teams  
 11 and special operations teams to undertake  
 12 strike missions against al Qaeda in Iraq,  
 13 and for other missions considered vital by  
 14 the United States commander in Iraq.

15 (5) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS  
 16 DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appro-  
 17 priate committees of Congress” means—

18 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of  
 19 the Senate; and

20 (B) the Committee on Armed Services of  
 21 the House of Representatives.

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